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SUMMARY 
In our report we have discussed aspects related to building design for ensuring the safe escape of 
occupants from a burning building. The occupants must be protected from the effects of fire and 
smoke. We have focused our attention on multi-storey buildings as the principles involved can be 
readily applied to all buildings. The most important consideration is the safety of life. Therefore the 
first principle is to ensure that there is adequate provision for speedy and safe escape in case of 
emergency. 
Despite the existence of fire safety regulations, the danger of life loss in fires is ever present. 
"Lack" of escape from fires is primarily due to delayed awareness, poor design of escape routes, 
smoke logging and interference with exits. Delayed awareness is one of the major reasons for 
fatalities. 
Life safety systems by which the occupants can escape from the effects of fire and smoke must 
be provided. In multi-storey buildings, this includes the installation of detection and warning 
systems such that early warning of a fire hazard is ensured. Travel distances should be minimized, 
·to reduce the exposure time for the occupants. The location, sizing and number of stairways and 
exits should be provided so that alternative routes of escape are available. The building occupants 
must be able to gain refuge to a safe place within an acceptable egress time period. The risk of fire 
occurring or spreading within the escape route must be minimized. The inadequacy of escape 
routes has often been responsible for tragedies. 
It is certain that two alternative routes must be provided in all buildings, except for 
small, low rise occupancies with restricted travel distances, floor areas and number 
of occupants. 
Computer based models are available to consider movement of crowds, and 
behaviour of people in fires. These will be integrated in the near future and will be 
valuable aids to the design of fire escapes. They should only be used by 
knowledgeable persons familiar with the factors which effect egress design (Wade 
1991 ). 
Techniques like the provision of places of refuge need to be incorporated in the 
design of large buildings. These can be considered safe zones for people in the 
event of a fire. 
Additional methods to promote safe escape can be employed in the design stages. 
These include; the provision of a early warning system, the use of fire resistant 
materials and methods of construction, the inclusion of smoke stop doors and 
lobbies, the installation of sprinklers and the care management of fire safety 
systems after installation. Exit ways must be clearly labelled and used as a matter 
of daily routine. Lighting needs to be provided in the event of an emergency. 
It can never be guaranteed that fire safety systems will provide 1 00% protection. Systems can fail, 
maintenance procedures can be abused and people do not always behave as we would wish. 
However, engineers and designers have an obligation to minimise the risk involved given reasonable 
building management procedures and human behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
The purpose of this report is to explain and discuss aspects related to building 
design for ensuring the safe escape of occupants from a burning building. The 
occupants must be protected from the effects of fire and smoke. We have focused 
our attention on multi-storey buildings as the principles involved can be readily 
applied to all buildings. 
Despite the existence of fire safety regulations, the danger of life loss in fires is 
ever present. "Lack" of escape from fires is primarily due to delayed awareness, 
poor design of routes to escapes, smoke logging and interference with exits. 
Delayed awareness is one of the major reasons for fatalities. 
Life safety systems by which the occupants can escape from the effects of fire 
and smoke must be provided. In multi-storey buildings, this includes the installation 
of detection and warning systems such that early warning of a fire hazard is 
ensured. Travel distances should be minimized, to reduce the exposure time for the 
occupants. The location, sizing and number of stairways and exits should be 
provided so that alternative routes of escape are available. The building occupants 
must be able to gain refuge to a safe place within an pcceptable egress time 
period. Escape routes must be protected to kept the occupants clear of the effects 
of fire and smoke originating from other parts of the building. The risk of fire 
occurring or spreading within the escape route m.ust be minimized. The inadequacy 
of e~cape routes has often been responsible for. tragedies. 
It can never be guaranteed that fire safety systems will provide 100% protection. 
Systems can fail, maintenance procedures can be abused and people do not always 
behave as we would wish. However, engineers and designers have an obligation 
to minimise the risk involved given reasonable building management procedures 
and human behaviour. 
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SECTION 1: MEANS OF ESCAPE. 
Exit design should be based upon an evaluation of a building's total fire defence 
policy and an analysis of the population characteristics and hazards of the building. 
The design should be treated holistically. That is, as an integral part of the "whole" 
system which provides reasonable safety to life from fire. 
Designing a means of egress involves more than the analysis of numbers 
(discussed in Section 3. Evacuation Modelling). Safe exit from a building requires 
a safe path of escape from fire, ready for use in case of emergency and sufficient 
to permit all occupants to reach a safe place before they are endangered by fire, 
smoke or heat. 
Depending upon the time required for the fire detection, alerting the building 
occupants and the location of the fire hazard, the fire or smoke produced may 
develop enough to prevent the use of the escape route provided. Because of this 
threat, at least one alternative facility, remote from the first, is essential. Provision 
of two separate means of egress is a fundamental safeguard except where a 
building or room is so small and arranged such that a second exit would not 
provide an appreciable increase in safety. There is no advantage of separate 
facilities if there is travel through a common space or use of common structural 
features, resulting in loss of the two separate exits in the case of an emergency. 
M+. .. ~ -L:.i- l ~~t1 · 
--..._ 
(_ BIC (~) investigated the provision for buildings with a single means of egress 
-in -,:~~ponse to a concern that the fire bylaw (SANZ, 1988 A) was deficient in 
allowing unlimited height for single egress buildings of small floor area. They 
indicated that the bylaw provisions were out of line with many overseas codes. As 
a result recommendations were made according to the maximum number of storeys 
to be limited to those described in table 1 for single egress buildings. 
I Commercial or Industrial Building 
I Low risk II Moderate risk I Sprinkler protected 
II 
4 II 2 
I Non-Sprinkler protected II 9 II 4 
Table 1.Number of storeys recommended by BIC investigation into single exit occupancies. Wade 
(1991) 
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SECTION 2: EMERGENCY MOVEMENT OF CROWDS DURING 
·BUILDING EVACUATION. 
There have been a number of useful publications and reviews published covering 
modelling of crowd movement. They include a comprehensive treatment by Fruin 
: ( 1971) which covers basic traffic and space relationships including the "level of 
service" concept which helps designers to specify the speeds and flows of 
pedestrians as a function of crowd density. 
') Pauls ( 1988) summarises some of the major research findings for design re crowd 
movement, management and behaviour as follows; 
i) Strive for simplicity in all movement routes: this lessons the need for 
directional graphics. 
ii) Capacity-handling channels should be conti,nues walking surfaces. 
iii) Ingress systems should be reversible to cater for egress. 
v 
Crowd movement in buildings is made up of three basic components which can be 
represented as follows; 
also 
Flow = Speed * Density * Width 
where: Speed = speed of crowd travel 
Density = population per unit area 
Width = width of exit facility under study 
Population = Flow * Flow time 
Population is the number of persons a movement facility can serve in a defined 
time, flow capacity is the number of persons passing a point in a unit of time, and 
flow time is the total time required for a crowd to move past a point in the egress 
system. 
Under fire conditions people are likely to be unfamiliar with the various exits from 
an area and thus neglect alternative means of exit; all exits need to be 
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conspicuously marked. It is also important that all exits from a building are used 
as a matter of daily routine so that occupants will be familiar with them. 
Modelling of people movement during the egress from buildings can be divided into 
two categories, movement models and behaviour models. The behaviourial models 
as they have been developed, are essentially of two types, conceptual models 
which have attempted to include the observed, empirical and reported actions from 
collective interview or questionnaire studies, and computer models for the 
simulation of the behaviour of the human individual in the fire incident. The escape 
activities indicated that the majority of people left by exit stairs they "normally" 
used whilst others used lifts or waited to be rescued. 
For a detailed description of flow modelling see Wade. 
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SECTION 3: EVACUATION MODELLING AND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION. 
3.1 EVACUATION MODELLING. 
There are a number of computer-based models for assessing the egress and 
evacuation of buildings. Some of the more interesting models are as follows; 
EVACNET + 
A computer program that models evacuation of buildings. It is 
network model that uses nodes to represent rooms and arcs to 
represent connecting routes. It is mainly concerned with movement 
between each element of the egress system. It is a flexible model 
which will produce an optimal evacuation plan for the building and 
can be used to evaluate different design options. 
BFIRES 
This model relates to human behaviour as well as movement. It is 
mainly a theoretical model. BFIRES considers three interacting 
components being: the fire and its by products; the building 
enclosure; and the human occupant. 
EESCAPE 
The model is applicable to the evacuation of multi-storey buildings via 
staircases and predicts the flow movement in terms of time with 
regard to the building's lay-out and the interdependencies between 
adjacent egress way elements. 
Models are extremely useful in the prediction of movement. However models of 
human behaviour have not been developed to the same degree and models 
incorporating behaviour and movement will be at least ten years away. (Fire Safety 
and Engineering. 1989) 
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3.2 EVACUATION PERFORMANCE EVALUATION. 
Time. 
The time allowed for the safe egress of occupants has been traditionally based on 
judgement and experience. Two and a half minutes has often been mentioned. This 
is thought to be the time that could be allowed without there being a serious risk 
of panic in the event of fire. Modern studies have shown this time to be reasonable 
in residential fires, as this is approximately the time it takes for conditions to 
become untenable for occupants (Ingham 1981 ). 
The means of escape provisions in DZ 4226 (SANZ 1984; Bastings, 1988) is 
stated to be pased on 2.5 minutes clearing time to a protected place where two 
alternative means of escape are available, and 1 minute where only one means of 
escape is present. 
Malhotra (1986) gives values of time for conditions to become critical in various 
situations and are listed in Table 2. He also proposed a design escape time adjusted 
to human factors as given in Table 3. 
Zone Time (min) 
Unprotected 2.0- 6.0 
Partially protected 5.0- 10.0 
Fully protected 30.0- 60.0 
Table 2. Time at which conditions become critical. 
Building Factor 
Domestic 0.8 
Hotels 0.7 
Hospitals 0.5 
Shops 0.8 
Offices, Schools, Factories 1.0 
Assembly buildings 0.7 
Table 3. Human design modification factors. (Malhotra ( 1986)) 
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In an engineered approach to means of escape design, the maximum permitted 
clearing time may not be fixed at all. Provided the time taken to evacuate the 
occupants to a place of safety does not exceed the time required for life-
threatening conditions to develop then the life safety objective has been achieved. 
Distance. 
It is appropriate to limit the distance of travel from any point to the nearest safe 
refuge. This will reduce the time occupants are exposed to the effects of fire and 
also to improve the escape time. The minimum travel distance will depend on; 
The expected fire severity and rapidity of spread. 
Number of exits. 
The use of the building, lay-out of furniture, equipment. 
The response behaviour of the occupant. 
The mobility and mental condition of the occupant. 
In the New Zealand code (SANZ, 1984) travel distances have been related to 
evacuation time by an arbitrary speed of travel; 12 m per minute for people in 
unfamiliar surroundings and 18 m per minute for people in familiar surroundings. 
(These times are very conservative and an able bodied person would have troubled 
walking this slowly.) This is graphically illustrated in Figure 1. 
_iL Watkin~ 
normal y 
Walking 
quickly 
~i!.abled 
~~ Congested 
. 
10 20 30 
Speed m/min 
) 
Figure 1. Travel speed assumptions. iL-1 
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Travel distances may be specified in terms of distance along the route of travel 
taking into account the actual distance to be travelled from any remote point in the 
building to the nearest exit, or in terms of the direct distance which is the shortest 
distance from any point to the exit. The direct distance would only be used during 
the design stage when the final position of partitions is unknown. Measurements 
of travel distance and direct distance are illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Measurement of travel distance and direct distance. 
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A comparison of travel distance requirements for some well known codes is shown 
in Table 4. Some codes recognised the contribution of sprinklers in increasing life 
safety in buildings and allow for increased travel distances. 
Code. Alternative means of Dead- end. 
escape available. 
NZS 1900 Ch.5 (1988) No limitation. 18 m travel to nearest 
exit. 
DZ 4226 SANZ ( 1984) 68 m travel. 27 m travel. 
45 m direct. 18 m direct. 
BS 5588: Part 3 { 1983) 45 m travel. 18 m travel. 
30m direct. 12 m direct. 
NBCC (1990) 40 m travel. 25 m travel. 
BCA (1990) 40 m travel. 20 m travel. 
30 m on ground level. 
Table 4. Travel distance requirements of some well known codes. 
SECTION 4: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR EVACUATION. 
Uncontrolled Simultaneous Evacuation. 
This is the simplest and most commonly used strategy and the one appropriate for 
the majority of buildings. On notification of a fire, in an uncontrolled simultaneous 
evacuation, all occupants are expected to make their way toward the exits and 
immediately evacuate the building. In some high-rise buildings where total 
evacuation times could exceed 30 minutes, an uncontrolled simultaneous 
evacuation may not be considered realistic or feasible due to the development of 
severe smoke conditions on floors below the level of evacuating occupants. With 
lengthy evacuation times it is also more likely that the evacuation process will be 
impeded by slower or physically disabled occupants. 
For these reasons alternative strategies could be considered involving a planned 
phased evacuation or reliance on safe places of refuge. 
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Phased Evacuation. 
Phased evacuation helps address problems with simultaneous evacuation in multi-
storey buildings where demand on the staircases is greatest and delays and 
queuing can occur at entrances to the staircases. Simultaneous evacuation gives 
each floor equal priority in accessing the stairway and so occupants of the floors 
which are under greater threat of fire and smoke may be delayed because of the 
flow of occupants from floors not immediately threatened by the effects of the fire. 
A phased evacuation gives priority firstly to the most threatened floors, usually the 
fire floor and the one above, and then the remaining upper floors can be evacuated 
followed by the lower floors. For phased evacuation to work effectively there must 
be building management systems in place to manage a controlled evacuation, with 
training provided to specified staff to act as fire wardens. There must also be a 
communications system in operation designed to provide the necessary information 
to those wardens throughout the building during the evacuation process. A phased 
evacuation plan would only be justified for relatively tall buildings with the 
necessary management and communication systems in place. 
The New Zealand Fire Service has issued guidelines on controlled evacuation in 
high-rise buildings (NZFS, 1988). They consider 15 floors or levels as a minimum 
height before controlled evacuation should be considered and recommended 
approved automatic sprinkler, manual fire alarm, emergency communications and 
emergency lighting systems. 
Places of Refuge. 
Escape route planning has the aim of providing the occupants from any where in 
the building the possibility of reaching a place of safety within or outside the 
building in the time available before the conditions become unbearable. The 
conventional approach required that all occupants should aim for the outside of the 
building however, in many situations the escape has to be in stages or phases 
either because of the occupants or the nature of the building. In high rise buildings 
it is only necessary for the occupants in the fire zone and the floor above to leave 
their areas and the rest to follow if the fire proves uncontrollable. To make 
provision for the simultaneous evacuation of a building with as many as 10,000 
occupants would require massive escape facilities. Areas of refuge have been 
proposed as a means for providing temporary protection for the occupants of high-
rise buildings. Areas such as a protected corridor,a protected staircase or an entire 
protected floor are considered suitable refuge areas as depicted in the Figure 3. 
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Figura 3. Provision of areas of safe refuge in high rise buildings. 
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SECTION 5: EXITWAY DESIGN AND CAPACITY. 
II A means of egress is a continuous path of travel from any point in 
a building or structure to the open air outside at ground level. II 
(Bryan) 
The types of permissible exits are; doors leading directly outside or through a 
protected passageway to the outside, smokeproof towers, interior and outside 
stairs, ramps, escalators that meet certain specific requirements, and moving 
walks. Elevators are not acceptable as exits. 
Entrances, exits and circulation areas are provided in all buildings for normal use, 
and means of escape considerations should utilise existing arrangements wherever 
possible. Exitways need be considered with regard to the existing exits in terms of: 
position; width; and number. 
The Position of Exits. 
If the angle made by lines joining the exits to any point on the floor of the storey 
under consideration is less than 45°, then the disposition of the exits may be 
inadequate. Ideally, staircases should be located diagonally opposite each other. 
Width of Exitways. 
It is essential that bottlenecks be avoided when designing means of escape. Thus 
corridors should not become narrower as they approach a storey exit or staircase. 
Number. 
The number of exitways has been discussed in Section 1 . 
In order for exitways and particularly stairs to ensure the safe passage of 
occupants they must be readily visible, with stairs treads of sufficient width to 
allow for adequate footing on each step. The handrail should be of a reachable 
height and be easy to grasp. 
The Minimum Width of Exitways. 
BIC (1990) specifies a minimum acceptable width between handrails as no less 
than 900 mm. The current fire bylaw (SANZ 1988 A) allows a single exit of unit 
width to be 610 mm wide. It has been shown that a minimum width of between 
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800 and 900 mm will accommodate the flow of occupants in single file, but 
passing in comfort would not be possible. This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
90 
~ 
, .. () \) 
150 
I~ 
nominal stair width 
,.I 
90 
~ 
150 
Figure 4. Measurement of effective s,tair width in relation to walls and handrails. (Wade 1991 ). 
,,_,, ,.._ \,) 
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EXITWAY CAPACITIES. 
The main methods of determining staircase width are; 
(1) based on the population of one floor, 
(2) based on total population, 
(3) based on capacity of stairs, 
(4) based on capacity of stairs and flow from final exit. 
Stair width based on the population of one floor appears to be the most common, 
and least conservative method adopted. This means that a two-storey building 
would have the same stair width as a ten-storey building. This is based on the 
assumption that by the time occupants of a floor reach the floor below, the 
occupants of the floor below have already left. 
The value of this assumption is questionable (Wade 1991). The interaction of 
escape routes may prevent the expected flow rates from being achieved. Phased 
evacuation of a multi-storey building can be used to address this problem. 
In order to satisfy the performance requirements of clearing occupants from a floor 
into a protected exitway in a specific time then the logical approach is to base stair 
width on total population. However, for tall buildings, the stair would have to be 
excessively wide. This method is not used and the New Zealand requirements of 
basing stair width on the single level population has operated without apparent 
problem. 
Stair width based on the capacity of stairs relies on there being available space in 
the stairway to accommodate all the occupants. By allowing sufficient space per 
person for reasonably free movement this method can result in excessive stair 
width. 
New Zealand Requirements. 
Existing provisions for exitway capacities in New Zealand can be found in NZS 
1900 Chapter 5 (SANZ 1988 A). These provisions appear to have originated from 
· early NFPA requirements for stairways and ramps, and later discredited by Pauls 
(1980) as being too high. 
Wade provides a detailed comparison between the current requirements and those 
derived by using the effective width model. The relationships have been 
summarised in Table 5. 
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Code. Requirement 
NZS 1900 Chapter 5 width = 
N > 60 
BIC (1990) width = 
level of safety --
two unit stair in NZS 1900 
BIC (1990) width = 
level of safety - 2.5 minute -
evacuation time. 
Where N = number of occupants; 
H = number of handre1ils; 
150 + 7.67 N 
300 E + 5. 9 N + 1 80 H 
300 E + 8.6 N + 180 H 
and E = number of exitwavs avCJilable for escape. 
Table 5. Comparison between current requirements and the effective width model (Wade 1991 l. 
SECTION 6: ADDITIONAL METHODS TO PROMOTE SAFE 
ESCAPE. 
Life safety design for a building is difficult. It involves more than a provision for 
emergency egress. It requires attention to who will be using the building, and what 
they will be doing most of the time. Then consideration must be given to 
communication and the protection of escape routes and temporary areas of refuge 
for a period of time reasonable for the building occupants to reach safety. 
A number of features may be required to ensure the safety of the routes, some of 
which are outlined below. 
Early Warning System. 
The earlier the detection of the fire, the sooner occupants will decide to evacuate, 
and the longer is the time. available for escape. Of course the fastest early warning 
system of all is an alert occupant in the vicinity of the fire, who is able to raise the 
general alarm. However, as spaces are not usually continuously occupied an 
automatic detection and alarm system may be necessary. The advantages of 
smoke detectors in providing an early warning of fire is universally accepted due 
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to the earlier stage in the fire development at which smoke detectors respond. 
Fire Resisting Construction. 
Fire-resisting construction is used to protect the escape route from the fire for a 
period of time sufficient for the occupants to have evacuated the building. The 
exitway provides a temporary "protected or safe place" for occupants as they 
make their way outside the building and therefore affords them with additional time 
to complete the evacuation before being endangered by the effects of the fire. 
Smoke Stop Doors And Lobbies. 
Used to limit the ingress of smoke into the escape route. Because the doors must 
be in a closed position to be effective they must be fitted with self closing devices 
if required, and furthermore must be able to be readily opened by escaping 
occupants. 
Lobbies are a safeguard against smoke penetration of a stairway and are especially 
advisable for enclosing elevator of lift suites where it may be impractical to 
adequately smoke-stop lift-landing doors to minimise vertical smoke spread up the 
lift shaft. Lobbies can also be used to extend the protected part of the escape 
route, to meet travel distance restrictions, or afford greater safety to occupants 
attempting to evacuate into a vertical staircase and faced with the possibility of 
delays due to queuing. They can also be an important staging post for the fire 
service to fight a fire, especially in taller buildings. 
Pressurisation of Escape Routes. 
Pressurisation is a means of preventing the ingress of smoke into the escape route 
by maintaining a pressure difference across the openings to the stairway to ensure 
the air flow is from the staircase to adjacent spaces rather than the reverse. It is 
based on the assumption that a fire is unlikely to originate within the exitway. 
Sprinklers. 
Sprinklers have commonly been associated with protecting buildings arid their 
contents (property) from fire loss. However, they can also play an important role 
in increasing life safety. By preventing widespread conflagration, people remote 
from the fire location are unlikely to be unduly threatened, while occupants near 
to the fire have less heat and smoke to combat and more time to escape. 
19 
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Surface Finishes. 
The surface finish of lining materials is commonly controlled within the exitway to 
minimise the risk of serious fire, as well and ceiling surfaces in particular can have 
a significant influence on the development of a fire. 
Fire Load. 
It is not acceptable to store combustible materials in an exitway, not only because 
they may impede the flow of occupants during an evacuation of the building but 
also because the presence of significant fire load increases the risk of a fire ignition 
occurring within the exitway, defeating its purpose of providing a protected place 
from fire. 
Emergency Lighting. 
Provision should be made for lighting escape routes should the main electricity 
supply fail for some reason. The emergency lighting should enable occupants to 
see directional signs associated with the escape route, changes in floor level, and 
the location of fire alarms and extinguishing equipment. 
Exitway Marking. 
The need for signs will depend on the nature of the occupancy. Where people are 
unfamiliar with their surroundings e.g., hotels, shops or places of assembly the 
need for signs will be greater. To be effective, the location colour and design of the 
sign should be considered, including a means to illuminate the sign. 
Elevators. 
The use of elevators has been discouraged for evacuation purposes traditionally 
because of lack of control over when or where they may open. Elevators can be 
designed as fire-fighting elevators if necessary at the disposal of the Fire Service 
for transportation of disabled persons. 
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CONCLUSIONS. 
The most important consideration is the safety of life. Therefore the first principle 
is to ensure that there is adequate provision for speedy and safe escape for the 
occupants in case of emergency. 
To ensure life safety, egress provisions cannot be considered in isolation from the 
total fire safety system, which may include the provision of sprinklers, smoke 
control systems, pressurised escape routes, alarm and detection systems and a 
comprehensive fire evacuation plan. 
It is certain that two alternative routes must be provided in all buildings, except for 
small, low rise occupancies with restricted travel distances, floor areas and number 
of occupants. 
The performance of an escape route can be evaluated in terms of design escape 
time and maximum travel distance. However the floor clearing times usually stated 
as 2.5 minutes will be longer in conditions of maximum demand. 
Computer based models are available to consider movement of crowds, and 
behaviour of people in fires. These will be integrated in the near future and will be 
valuable aids to the design of fire escapes. They should only be used by people 
knowledgeable persons familiar with the factors which effect egress design (Wade 
1991 ). Predictions of total egress time need to consider the time associated with 
human behaviour during the evacuation. 
Alternative strategies for evacuation exist and should be employed in high rise 
buildings. Techniques like the provision of places of refuge need to be incorporated 
in the design of large buildings. These can be considered safe zones for people in 
the event of a fire. 
Additional methods to promote safe escape can be employed in the design stages. 
These include; the provision of a early warning system, the use of fire resistant 
materials and methods of construction, the inclusion of smoke stop doors and 
lobbies, the installation of sprinklers and the care management of fire safety 
systems after installation. Exit ways must be clearly labelled and used as a matter 
of daily routine. Lighting needs to be provided in the event of an emergency. 
21 
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